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INTRODUCTION 
I am honored to participate in this Symposium celebrating the prodigious 
contributions of my colleague Tamar Frankel to the field of corporate law.  
One important theme of Tamar’s recent work is the idea of trust in corporate 
law.1  It seems fitting, therefore, to take a fresh look at the promise and perils 
of independent directors in corporate governance.  The independent director 
has always held a special place in the hearts and minds of corporate lawmakers 
as an idealized monitor of executives’ behavior.  Independent directors are 
trusted to make the right decisions on major issues when insiders are con-
flicted.  They also play an important advisory role for management. 
Recent governance reforms – the Sarbanes-Oxley Act2 and then the Dodd-
Frank Act3 – reinforced this centrality of independent directors by mandating 
 
∗ Howard Zhang Faculty Research Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston University 
School of Law, fredtung@bu.edu.  For helpful comments, I am grateful to David Walker 
and Charles Whitehead, as well as Symposium participants at The Role of Fiduciary Law 
and Trust in the Twenty-First Century: A Conference Inspired by the Work of Tamar Fran-
kel, Boston University School of Law.  
1 See, e.g., TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA’S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A 
CROSSROAD (2006). 
2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended 
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independent majorities on all public company boards and requiring that crucial 
board committees be comprised solely of independent directors.  In our hopes 
and dreams, then, the independent director offers something of a magic bullet 
for corporate governance. 
Yet we corporate law scholars have always harbored some ambivalence 
about the magic of this bullet.  As much as we seem to trust independent direc-
tors to do the right thing, no solid empirical evidence exists to suggest that in-
dependent directors add value.4  Moreover, we have seen spectacular failures 
in the face of independent boards.5  
How do we account for this disconnect between our intuitions and best in-
tentions, on the one hand, and the stubborn refusal of the empirical evidence to 
confirm our faith in independent directors?  Several possibilities come to mind.  
First, existing definitions of independence may be too lax.  Only financial or 
familial ties between a director and an officer of the firm will definitively dis-
qualify the director from independent status.6  Many corporate scholars share a 
suspicion that this focus is too narrow; the list of disqualifying relationships 
may fail to capture the full range of incentives that outside directors might 
have to favor management.7  So our intuitive faith in independent directors 
could be correct, but perhaps existing independent directors are simply not in-
dependent enough.  
A second possibility (not exclusive of the first) is that firms may be hetero-
geneous, such that optimal board composition may vary across firms.  Inde-
 
in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). 
3 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
4 See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Indepen-
dence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 233 (2002) (“The convention-
al wisdom favoring highly independent boards lacks a solid empirical foundation.”); Benja-
min E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an Endogenously 
Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., 
Apr. 2003, at 8 (stating that empirical research has established that board composition is not 
correlated with firm performance); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Mak-
ing of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1530-32 (2005) (summarizing 
the empirical literature showing that neither independent boards nor fully independent audit 
committees improve firm performance). 
5 See Bhagat & Black, supra note 4, at 233 (explaining that eleven of Enron’s fourteen 
directors were independent at the time of its fiasco). 
6 See, e.g., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.02(a)-(b) 
(2010), available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selected 
node=chp_1_4&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F [hereinafter NYSE 
LISTED COMPANY MANUAL] (listing “independence tests” that determine whether a director 
qualifies as independent). 
7 See, e.g., Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and Structural Bi-
as, 32 J. CORP. L. 833, 845-46 (2007) (detailing the relationships between Disney CEO Mi-
chael Eisner and nominally independent Disney directors that rendered “the bulk of the Dis-
ney board . . . not independent in any common sense use of the term”). 
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pendent boards may add value at some firms but not others.  An emerging 
theoretical literature argues, for example, that firms’ information environments 
matter.8  Outside directors will always suffer informational disadvantages rela-
tive to insiders, and this disadvantage will be greater in firms where outsiders 
have greater difficulty acquiring information about the firm.  Independent di-
rectors at more opaque firms—those with high information costs—will there-
fore be less effective monitors or advisers than independent directors at more 
transparent (low information cost) firms. 
Monitors’ incentives and information are central to constraining agency 
costs.  Happily, two recent empirical studies tackle these important issues.  
Byoung-Hyoun Hwang and Seoyoung Kim study the incentives of nominally 
independent directors.  They ask whether the existence of common back-
grounds between CEOs and their nominally independent directors may affect 
directors’ monitoring.9  They find that it does: on a number of metrics, inde-
pendent directors who share important background with their CEOs (what they 
call “socially dependent directors”) do worse as monitors than socially inde-
pendent directors.10  Another recent study focuses on directors’ costs of acquir-
ing information about their firms.  Professors Ran Duchin, John Matsusaka, 
and Oguzhan Ozbas study the effect of firms’ information costs on indepen-
dent directors’ efficacy in improving firm performance.11  They find that add-
ing independent directors adds value for firms with low information costs, but 
diminishes value for firms where information costs are high.12 
These studies suggest that the independent director’s place in corporate go-
vernance may be more complicated than we thought.  Formal independence 
without social independence may be insufficient to assure the effectiveness of 
independent directors.  And independent directors may be beneficial for some 
firms but not others, depending on firms’ transparency.  If these claims are cor-
rect, then our current thinking on independent directors may be too blunt.  We 
may need to refine our trust in independent directors or tailor our expectations 
about their efficacy.  Part I discusses the Hwang and Kim study, which raises 
important questions concerning current definitions of director independence.  
 
8 Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, A Theory of Friendly Boards, 62 J. FIN. 217, 218 
(2007); Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, A Theory of Board Control and Size, 21 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 1797, 1798-99 (2008); Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Endogenously 
Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 96, 96 
(1998); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 
1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1541 
(2007) (discussing the effect of the increasing informativeness of stock prices on the sys-
temic value of independent directors). 
9 Byoung-Hyoun Hwang & Seoyoung Kim, It Pays to Have Friends, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 
138, 139 (2009). 
10 Id. 
11 Ran Duchin, John G. Matsusaka & Oguzhan Ozbas, When Are Outside Directors Ef-
fective?, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 195, 196 (2010). 
12 Id. 
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Part II discusses the study by Duchin, Matsusaka, and Oguzhan, which offers 
an information-based roadmap for tailoring our expectations for the gover-
nance benefits of independent directors. 
I. INCENTIVES: SHARED BACKGROUND AND FORMAL INDEPENDENCE 
Individuals are no doubt motivated by more than economic incentives.  So-
cial influences may be especially important for folks like corporate directors, 
who work with insiders and with each other in small groups, with every expec-
tation of repeated interaction in the course of long-term professional and per-
sonal relationships.13  Ideally, social ties and social influences could be incor-
porated into our thinking on director independence.  But social incentives are 
messy; they are hard to measure or analyze rigorously.  Perhaps that explains 
why social influences on nominally independent directors have only recently 
begun to draw scholarly attention.  Hwang and Kim’s study offers a rigorous 
empirical analysis of the effects of a particular type of social influence on in-
dependent directors’ monitoring efficacy.   
A. Sociology Meets the Board of Directors 
In general, current rules deem a director independent provided she has no 
significant financial or familial ties to executive officers of the firm or to the 
firm itself.14  However, this filter may not be sufficiently discriminating.  A 
major concern is that it ignores social influence.  It assumes away social norms 
and social pressures that we know affect behavior.15 
1. Small-Group Dynamics 
Scholars in psychology, sociology, and law have identified board social dy-
namics that might affect a director’s nominally independent judgment.  Small-
group dynamics operate within boards of directors no less than in other group 
decisionmaking contexts.  Studies have adduced evidence, for example, that 
social influence and norms of reciprocity affect board decisions.  CEO pay 
tends to be higher when the CEO enjoys social influence over independent di-
rectors,16 for example, when the CEO also chairs the board or serves on the 
compensation committee.17  Demographic similarity also enhances social in-
 
13 See MARVIN E. SHAW, GROUP DYNAMICS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SMALL GROUP 
BEHAVIOR (1981); James S. Coleman, Constructed Organization: First Principles, 7 J. L. 
ECON. & ORG. 7, 11-12 (Special Issue 1991). 
14 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
15 Whether this weakness is remediable, though, is another issue.  See infra Part I.D. 
16 Charles A. O’Reilly III & Brian G. M. Main, Economic and Psychological Perspec-
tives on CEO Compensation: A Review and Synthesis, 19 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 675, 686-
87  (2010).  
17 Id. at 15.  Other measures of social influence include the number of board committees 
on which the CEO serves and whether she is older than the compensation committee chair.  
Id. 
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fluence.18  One study shows that when the CEO and members of the compen-
sation committee are closer in age, CEO compensation is higher.19  CEO pay is 
also higher when independent directors feel reciprocity obligations toward the 
CEO.20  Reciprocity norms may be at work for example, when the CEO serves 
on the nominating committee that nominated a particular director, when the 
compensation committee chair enjoys high fees, or when the CEO precedes the 
compensation committee chair on the board.21 
2. Thick Social Ties 
In addition to group dynamics, nominally independent directors may share 
thick social ties with the CEO or other officers outside of their involvement 
with the firm.  They may belong to the same social clubs or share deep in-
volvement in the same civic organizations.  They may simply be friends.  So-
cial ties imply shared qualities and experiences among individuals.  These 
shared qualities and experiences facilitate interaction, understanding, and per-
sonal connections.  For purposes of independent director monitoring, these in-
fluences may be especially important.  A social relationship “disposes one to 
interpret favorably another’s intentions and actions.”22  In discharging her 
monitoring function, a nominally independent director with social ties to the 
CEO might naturally be predisposed to generally giving the CEO the benefit of 
the doubt.  The famous decision in In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation 
posed just this scenario.  
In Oracle, Vice Chancellor Strine rejected claims of independence for a 
special litigation committee (SLC) comprised of two Stanford University pro-
fessors.  The SLC was tasked with deciding the fate of a derivative suit against 
Oracle Corporation, whose board had deep ties to Stanford.23  Among Oracle’s 
director defendants in the suit were (1) another Stanford professor who had 
taught one of the SLC members and served with the same SLC member on the 
steering committee for a Stanford policy institute, the Stanford Institute for 
 
18 Anne S. Tsui & Charles A. O’Reilly III, Beyond Simple Demographic Effects: The Im-
portance of Relational Demography in Superior-Subordinate Dyads, 32 ACAD. MGMT. J. 
402, 404-05 (1989). 
19 Brian G. M. Main, Charles A. O’Reilly III & James Wade, The CEO, the Board of Di-
rectors and Executive Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives, 4 INDUS. 
& CORP. CHANGE 293, 319-20 (1995). 
20 O’Reilly & Main, supra note 16, at 3. 
21 Id. These cozy relationships that do not involve direct financial interests of directors 
are often referred to as “structural bias” in the legal literature.  See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. 
McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and Structural Bias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833, 848 (2007) (not-
ing that “[w]e would be hard pressed to better depict structural bias” than with the Disney 
board involved in Michael Ovitz’s hiring and then unceremonious firing as Disney’s presi-
dent).   
22 Brian Uzzi, The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the Economic Per-
formance of Organizations: The Network Effect, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 674, 678 (1996). 
23 In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 945-46 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
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Economic Policy Research (SIEPR); (2) a Stanford alumnus who had directed 
millions of dollars in donations to Stanford, chaired SIEPR’s advisory board, 
and had endowed a conference center at SIEPR; and (3) Oracle’s CEO, who 
had also made multimillion-dollar donations to Stanford and was considering 
additional donations at the time the SLC was formed.24  These thick social ties 
left the court doubtful about the impartiality of the SLC directors.25  The court 
therefore denied the SLC’s motion to dismiss the derivative suit.26  
B. It Pays to Have Friends 
Hwang and Kim’s study goes beyond the existing literature on group dy-
namics and thick social ties among directors.  They identify relatively weak 
social ties – more in the nature of shared backgrounds and not direct social 
connections – and demonstrate that affinity based on shared backgrounds may 
also affect director decisionmaking.  While the existing structural bias and so-
cial influence literature focuses on thick social connections and group dynam-
ics, Hwang and Kim focus on much thinner connections, which makes their 
study novel and important. 
Hwang and Kim identify potentially important shared background between 
nominally independent directors and CEOs and introduce evidence that these 
elements of shared background affect board monitoring.27  While acknowledg-
ing that boards may play an advisory role, for which social affinity might be 
beneficial, their focus is on monitoring, so they look primarily at CEO com-
pensation issues, which trigger greater monitoring concerns than advising is-
sues.28  They look at Fortune 100 CEOs and boards of directors from 1996-
2005, assessing the strength of shared background (what they call “social ties”) 
 
24 Id. at 920-21. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. Somewhat surprisingly, though, Oracle’s SLC members could still qualify as inde-
pendent directors under some definitions.  Independence requirements for companies listed 
on the New York Stock Exchange, for example, do not specifically prohibit the troubling 
relationships described in Oracle.  Contributions to tax exempt organizations, regardless of 
amount, are not enumerated as an objective disqualification from independence.  Such con-
tributions need only be disclosed, and only if an independent director serves as an executive 
officer of the tax exempt organization and contributions to the organization exceed the 
greater of $1 million and 2% of the organization’s consolidated gross revenues in any of the 
most recent three fiscal years. NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 6, 
§ 303A.02(b)(v) (disclosure requirement).  The Listed Company Manual does include a 
somewhat subjective catch-all provision regarding director independence determinations: 
“No director qualifies as ‘independent’ unless the board of directors affirmatively deter-
mines that the director has no material relationship with the listed company (either directly 
or as a partner, shareholder or officer of an organization that has a relationship with the 
company).”  Id. § 303A.02(a). 
27 Hwang & Kim, supra note 9, at 139 (finding evidence that social ties matter by eva-
luating executive compensation packages). 
28 Id. 
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between the CEO and each conventionally independent director of the firm.29  
They find that the presence of social ties on the board has a number of signifi-
cant effects on CEO compensation, CEO turnover, and firm performance.30 
1. Identifying Social Ties 
Relying on economics and sociology literature, Hwang and Kim identify 
five types of shared background that might matter: mutual alma mater, military 
service, regional origin, academic discipline, and industry.31 
Mutual alma mater.  Graduates from the same university share a bond in 
terms of shared traditions and experiences, as well as a sense of group belong-
ing.  For purposes of this study, a social tie exists if the CEO and the director 
graduated from the same university and were born within three years of each 
other.32  This latter condition assures that the CEO and director overlapped in 
their years of attendance, which increases the similarity of their experiences as 
well as the likelihood that they knew each other before their shared tenure with 
the firm.33 
Military service.  Veterans share a common experience insofar as the struc-
ture and function of the military and its demands have no parallel in civilian 
working environments.34 
Regional origin.  Hwang and Kim cite to studies showing cultural and life-
style similarities within geographical regions of the United States.35  Ameri-
cans view themselves as sharing certain traits based on geography, and evi-
dence suggests they make social choices based on regional homophily.  Hwang 
and Kim use birthplace as a proxy for regional affiliation, categorizing by U.S. 
region or non-U.S. country of birth.36  
Academic discipline and industry.  A shared academic discipline or industry 
captures shared interests and common experiences between the CEO and direc-
tor.37 
 
29 Id. at 143 tbl.1. 
30 Id. at 155. 
31 Id. at 140-41 (explaining how these social ties produce enhanced interaction, shared 
experiences, and common interests). 
32 Id. at 141-42. 
33 Id. at 141. 
34 Id. (“[V]eterans are in an environment that depends on a highly structured, organized 
force . . . [with] a demand not paralleled in any other work environment, suggesting that this 
unique shared experience contributes to a steadfast bond among veterans.” (internal quota-
tions omitted)). 
35 Id. at 140. 
36 Id.  Though admittedly birthplace is not a perfect proxy, it is objectively identifiable 
and less malleable than the more vague notion of where someone is “from.”  Id.  The au-
thors use the United States Census Bureau’s regional classifications: South, Northeast, 
Midwest, Mountain, Pacific, and Territories.  Id. 
37 Id. at 141. 
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2. Comparing Boards 
Hwang and Kim distinguish between conventionally independent boards 
and socially independent boards.  Conventionally independent boards are com-
prised of a majority of conventionally independent directors – those with no 
familial or material financial relationship with the firm or any of its executive 
officers.38  A socially independent board, by contrast, has a majority of direc-
tors that are both conventionally and socially independent.  The authors deem a 
director socially dependent if she has two or more social ties with the firm’s 
CEO.39  
C. Do Social Ties Matter? 
The study first looks at CEO compensation.  Hwang and Kim find that con-
ventionally independent boards show no statistically significant effect on CEO 
compensation, as compared to nonindependent boards.  But the presence of a 
socially independent board has a statistically significant effect in reducing 
CEO compensation, as measured by both salary plus bonus and total compen-
sation.40  The effect is also economically significant: the average drop in total 
compensation is $3.3 million, while average total compensation for the sample 
is $12.8 million.41  Hwang and Kim also find a statistically significant differ-
ence in compensation when comparing conventionally versus socially inde-
pendent boards.42 
By itself, this difference in compensation may not tell us all we need to 
know.  Possible explanations exist that are unrelated to agency costs and moni-
toring effectiveness.  For example, when the CEO’s job is more complex or 
 
38 A director is classified as independent if he or she is not a current or former employee 
of the firm (or of a subsidiary of the firm), a relative of an executive officer, a customer of 
or a supplier to the company, a provider of professional services, a recipient of charitable 
funds, a designee under a documented agreement by a significant shareholder or group, or 
interlocked with an executive of the firm. 
Id. at 142.  This tracks the IRRC definition.  Id.. 
39 In addition to the five types of social ties described above, a director is also credited 
with a social tie to the CEO if that director and the CEO each share two of the above-
specified social ties with another director: 
For example, suppose that the CEO is a 55-year-old, Stanford-educated, business major 
who served in the military and was born in the Northeast, and director A is a 55-year-
old, Stanford-educated, electrical engineering major born in the South. Although the di-
rector and CEO share only one direct tie (i.e., through mutual alma mater), if there is 
third-party director B who is a 57-year-old Stanford graduate who studied electrical 
engineering and served in the military, then we consider director A socially dependent 
to the CEO (because in addition to their mutual alma mater connection, the two are so-
cially connected to a mutual third party with whom each shares two direct ties).    
Id. 
40 Id. at 145. 
41 Id. at 146. 
42 Id. at 148. 
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difficult, she may need an advisory board more than a monitoring board.  She 
may therefore rely on a more collaborative board, whose value is enhanced by 
social ties. 
To address this concern, the study also compares firm operating perfor-
mance for conventionally independent boards versus socially independent 
boards.43  The study calculates CEOs’ predicted excess compensation from 
having boards that are conventionally but not socially independent,44 and then 
regresses operating performance on this predicted excess compensation.  A 
positive correlation would suggest that a CEO’s compensation premium from 
having a socially dependent board could be explained by the need for a strong 
advisory board to run a more complex firm.  The results, however, show a sig-
nificant negative relation between predicted excess compensation and subse-
quent operating performance.45  So the advisory needs of a complex firm can-
not explain the social ties, because the excess compensation attributed to social 
ties correlates with worse subsequent operating performance.  Instead, it ap-
pears that socially dependent boards are simply weaker monitors.46 
Hwang and Kim make a number of additional findings consistent with this 
interpretation.  CEO pay is less sensitive to stock performance with socially 
dependent boards.47  This result is economically significant: with a 20% stock 
loss, the CEO’s total compensation decreases on average by 10.2% less if the 
board is socially dependent.48  CEO turnover is also significantly less likely 
with a socially dependent board.  All else equal, the probability decreases by 
3.7%.49  There is also some evidence – though not statistically significant – 
that the probability of CEO turnover is less sensitive to firm performance with 
a socially dependent board.50 
 
43 Id.  The study uses three accounting measures for subsequent operating performance – 
return on assets, return on sales, and return on equity.  It measures subsequent operating per-
formance for one-, two-, and three-year periods.  Id.  
44 Id.  Essentially, after accounting for standard economic determinants of compensation, 
any excess is attributed to board structure and other governance variables.  See John E. 
Core, Robert W. Holthausen & David F. Larcker, Corporate Governance, Chief Executive 
Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 371, 390-91 (1999). 
45 Hwang & Kim, supra note 9, at 149. 
46 Id.  The effect is also economically significant.  Taking three-year measures of operat-
ing performance, a one standard deviation increase in predicted excess compensation is as-
sociated with average annual decreases of 0.4% for return on assets, 0.5% for return on 
sales, and 0.7% in return on equity.   Id. 
47 Id. at 150. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 151. 
50 Id.  These CEO turnover findings are interesting because prior studies have shown sig-
nificant differences in CEO turnover probability following poor firm performance, as be-
tween conventionally independent boards and non-independent boards.  See Michael S. 
Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 453-55 (1988) (de-
monstrating the much higher rate of CEO retirements following poor performance when the 
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Hwang and Kim also look at audit committee composition and its relation to 
CEO bonuses.51  Evidence exists that managers sometimes attempt to manipu-
late earnings to maximize their bonuses, and that the level of manipulation is a 
function of firm governance structures.  Firms with independent audit commit-
tees engage in less earnings management.52  Hwang and Kim find that, among 
firms with independent audit committees, CEOs receive higher bonuses when 
at least one committee member is socially dependent.  This effect is economi-
cally as well as statistically significant.  On average, the bonus is $0.734 mil-
lion greater, while the average bonus over the sample is $2.6 million.53   
D. Caveats and Implications 
Hwang and Kim’s interesting findings should be qualified with one small 
caveat.  While they do include a standard battery of controls for firm, gover-
nance, and CEO characteristics, they ironically do not control for the more 
commonly identified social influences within boards that have been shown to 
affect board decisionmaking and CEO pay.54  For example, as earlier noted, 
researchers in both finance and organizational behavior have found a positive 
correlation between CEO pay and (i) the proportion of outside directors ap-
pointed after the CEO took office,55 (ii) whether the CEO was appointed before 
the compensation committee chair became a director,56 and (iii)  whether the 
CEO was a member of a formal nominating committee of the board.57  Each of 
these factors is consistent with the operation of reciprocity norms that enable 
the CEO to influence directors’ decisions about the CEO’s pay.58  Perhaps ac-
counting for these other social influences would not have much affected their 
results, but inclusion of additional controls or tests for interactive effects be-
tween their shared background factors and these previously identified social 
influences might have enabled Hwang and Kim to more cleanly distinguish the 
effects of the shared background factors on which their study focuses. 
 
company’s board of directors had 60% or more independent directors).  Hwang’s and Kim’s 
findings add another important piece to the puzzle.  Hwang & Kim, supra note 9, at 151.  
51 Hwang & Kim, supra note 9, at 151-52. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 152.  The analysis controls for total CEO compensation and a number of meas-
ures of firm performance.  Id. 
54 Hwang and Kim do control for whether the CEO also chairs the board, id. at 156, a 
factor that likely confers social influence on the CEO and has been shown to correlate with 
higher CEO pay,  John E. Core, Robert W. Holthausen & David F. Larcker, Corporate Go-
vernance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 
371, 385-88 (1999). 
55 Id.; see also James Wade, Charles A. O’Reilly, III, & Ike Chandratat, 35 ADMIN. SCI. 
Q. 587, 598 (1990) (relating to golden parachutes). 
56 Main, O’Reilly & Wade, supra note 19, at 319. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
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In any event, Hwang and Kim’s study offers important empirical evidence 
confirming our suspicions that existing definitions of independence may not 
capture all the potential influences that may affect directors’ impartiality.  The 
appropriate policy response, however, is unclear.  On the one hand, we might 
be tempted to expand the list of relationships or shared experiences that in 
some combination disqualify a director from independent status.  On the other 
hand, the shared experiences that Hwang and Kim identify seem fairly general, 
such that it may be doubted that any expanded list of disqualifying factors 
could hope to be comprehensive.  Shared regional origin or academic discip-
line or industry, for example, all seem likely to capture huge numbers of indi-
viduals.  One might imagine similarly general shared experiences – shared 
nonprofit backgrounds or religious affiliation, for example – that might possi-
bly combine with others to affect director monitoring.  And the list could go 
on, as new forms of shared experiences are created and/or discovered to affect 
monitoring incentives.   
Rather than driving us to rethink independence requirements, Hwang and 
Kim’s findings may instead cast doubt that a workable definition of indepen-
dence exists that could possibly capture the variety of shared experiences that 
might dampen conventionally independent directors’ monitoring incentives.  
Any such attempt at rulemaking would be unavoidably over- and underinclu-
sive.59 
Perhaps we should acknowledge that there may be limits to our capacity to 
operationalize independence ex ante.  Instead, we may need to rely on the fine-
grained ex post analysis of judges, as exemplified by Vice Chancellor Strine in 
Oracle.  This is not to suggest that ex ante independence requirements may not 
be improved along other margins.  But as with many features of corporate go-
vernance, managing actors’ incentives may be tricky, and shared experiences 
and other social influences may be too numerous and subtle for comprehensive 
ex ante enumeration. 
II. INFORMATION AND INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS   
In addition to incentives, information also matters for directors’ efficacy.60  
Though the literature notes the importance of information for independent di-
rectors and recognizes the information deficit that outside directors suffer 
compared to insiders, scholars have not, until recently, attempted to measure 
the effects of information on independent directors’ efficacy.   
Professors Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas (“DMO”) offer such a study.61  
They hypothesize that as the costs of obtaining information vary across firms, 
so will the efficacy of independent directors’ efforts.  While DMO confirm, 
 
59 This is not to suggest that current definitions of director independence could not be 
improved, cf. supra note 26 and accompanying text, but merely that Hwang and Kim’s in-
teresting findings may not translate easily to crafting stricter definitions of independence.  
60 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
61 Duchin, Matsusaka & Ozbas, supra note 11, at 196. 
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consistent with the existing literature, that increasing the percentage of inde-
pendent directors on a board does not help or hurt firm performance on aver-
age, they show that the performance effect of increasing board independence 
for public companies depends on information costs.  For high-information-cost 
firms, performance suffers with an increase in board independence.  Low-
information-cost firms, however, benefit from an increase in the percentage of 
independent directors.62  
A. Methodology 
DMO use three different measures for a firm’s information costs.  First, they 
count the number of analysts who posted earnings forecasts for the firm in a 
given year.  Greater analyst following typically means more information avail-
able to outsiders.63  DMO’s second measure is the dispersion of analyst fore-
casts.  A wider dispersion suggests more difficulty for outsiders to evaluate the 
firm.64  Third, DMO measure analyst forecast error – i.e., the absolute differ-
ence between the mean analyst forecast and the firm’s subsequent quarterly 
earnings announcement.65  As with dispersion of forecasts, a larger forecast er-
ror indicates greater difficulty for outsiders to become informed about the firm.  
From these three measures, DMO create an information cost index for each 
firm.66 
Perhaps the greatest challenge with studies of board composition is that 
board composition is endogenous.67  Attributing causal effect is fraught with 
peril because of the difficulty of identifying, for example, whether a change in 
board composition is the cause or the effect of a change in firm performance.  
Or perhaps changes in board composition and firm performance both covary 
with some third factor.  DMO overcome this difficulty by exploiting changes 
in board independence rules between 1999 and 2003.68  Changes in 1999 in 
NYSE and NASDAQ listing rules, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, all re-
quired that audit committees comprise only independent directors.69  Then, in 
2003, NYSE and NASDAQ rule changes mandated majority independent 
boards.  For firms that were not in compliance at the time of these rule 
 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 201. 
64 Id. at 201-02 (“[The dispersion of analyst forecasts is] measured as the standard devia-
tion of earnings forecasts across analysts prior to a quarterly earnings announcement, nor-
malized by the firm’s total book assets and averaged across four quarters in a given year.”). 
65 Id. at 202 (explaining that both the second and third measures are “normalized by the 
firm’s total book assets and averaged across four quarters for a given year”). 
66 Id. (“We also construct an information cost index that combines the three separate 
measures by averaging a firm’s percentile rankings in the sample according to each measure 
. . . .  We then scale the index range from zero (low) to one (high).”). 
67 Id. at 196. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
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changes, the external mandates, and not endogenous factors, likely drove sub-
sequent appointments of independent directors.  This simplifies the investiga-
tors’ efforts to identify causal effects of independent directors’ appointments.70 
DMO assess the performance of publicly traded firms between 2000 – be-
fore the rule changes described above – and 2005, after the rule changes.71 
They compare changes in performance for firms not in compliance with man-
datory director independence requirements in 2000 with firms that were in 
compliance, and therefore not required by rule changes to appoint new inde-
pendent directors.72 
B. Findings 
DMO use three measures of firm performance: return on assets (ROA), To-
bin’s Q,73 and annual stock return.74  When they test the effects of exogenous 
changes in the percentage of independent directors on these performance 
measures without accounting for information costs, the results are statistically 
insignificant, consistent with the prior literature.  However, when they interact 
exogenous changes in the percentage of independent directors with their in-
formation cost index, they find that the performance effect of increased board 
independence depends on firms’ information costs, and this effect is both sta-
tistically and economically significant for all three performance measures.75  
For firms in the lowest quartile of information costs in their sample, a 10% in-
crease in the percentage of independent directors is associated with 1.3% high-
er ROA, 8.1% higher Tobin’s Q, and 3.8% higher annual stock return.76  By 
contrast, for firms in the highest information cost quartile, a 10% increase in 
the percentage of independent directors is associated with a 1.7% decrease in 
ROA, 15.8% lower Tobin’s Q, and 2.4% lower annual stock return.77  DMO 
 
70 Id.  DMO use noncompliance with new board independence rules as an instrument to 
identify exogenous changes  in the percentage of outside directors.  Their main results rely 
on noncompliance with audit committee independence as their instrument.  Id.  
71 Id. at 200-02.  
72 Id. at 202. 
73 Tobin’s Q is the ratio between the market value and the replacement value of the same 
physical asset.  See James Tobin & William R. Brainard, Asset Markets and the Cost of 
Capital, in ECONOMIC PROGRESS, PRIVATE VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR 
OF WILLIAM FELLNER 235, 235 (Bela Balassa & Richard Nelson eds., 1977). 
74 Duchin, Matsusaka & Ozbas, supra note 11, at 200.  DMO measure ROA and Tobin’s 
Q in 2000 and 2005.  They compute average monthly stock returns from the end of 2000 to 
the end of 2005.   
75 Id. at 204.  The coefficients on the interaction term are negative and statistically signif-
icant, while the coefficients on the changes in board independence variable by itself are pos-
itive and significant.  Id. at 202 tbl.3. 
76 Id. at 204. 
77 Id. 
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obtain similar results when they test for changes in board control, instead of 
changes in the percentage of independent directors on a board.78 
These data suggest some interesting implications.  Before the rules changed, 
managers in low information cost firms may have been inefficiently limiting 
the number of independent directors in order to reduce board oversight.  In 
those cases, the rule changes pushed firms toward value-enhancing board com-
positions by requiring them to add independent directors.  On the other hand, 
high information cost firms may have been optimally constituted with insider-
dominated boards before the rule changes, since with high information costs, 
independent directors are likely to be less effective at both advising and moni-
toring.  The new regulations pushed these high information cost firms into in-
efficient board structures by mandating more independent directors. 
Given DMO’s results suggesting the importance of information costs for op-
timal board composition, one might wonder whether firms account for infor-
mation costs when they compose their boards.  DMO find evidence that firms 
do.  High information cost firms have fewer independent directors than low in-
formation cost firms, but the difference is not large.79  By one estimate, the 
percentage of independent directors on boards of firms in the highest informa-
tion cost quartile is only 2.7% lower than for firms in the lowest quartile.80 
This evidence does, however, reinforce the general idea that information costs 
matter for optimal board composition. 
DMO also find evidence that independent directors’ advising function may 
be less important than their monitoring function.81  To be sure that director in-
dependence drives their results, and not director expertise, DMO control for 
directors’ financial expertise, academic affiliation, and whether a director is an 
executive officer or consultant for another corporation.  Not only do their orig-
inal results hold, but director expertise turns out to have no statistically signifi-
cant effect on firm performance.82  Because special expertise is likely to matter 
more for directors’ advising function than for monitoring, this suggests that in-
dependent directors’ monitoring role may be more important. 
C. Caveats 
Endogeneity may be a concern with any complex governance study.  
DMO’s study assumes that information costs are exogenous – that whether a 
firm’s information costs for outsiders are high or low does not depend on the 
firm’s governance or other firm features.  Other empirical work suggests that a 
firm’s information environment may be endogenous and not static.  Todd A. 
Gormley, Bong Hwan Kim, and Xiumin Martin find, for example, that Indian 
 
78 Id. at 206 tbl.5, 207.  To eliminate alternative explanations for their results, DMO con-
trol for industry, firm size, and the expertise of individual directors.  Id. at 207-08. 
79 Id. at 211 tbl.9, 212. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 208. 
82 Id. at 208 tbl.6. 
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firms improve their accounting quality as foreign banks enter local markets.83  
They suggest that this improved transparency derives from firms’ desire for 
better financing terms from foreign banks.  Improved accounting quality is also 
positively related to firms’ subsequent debt levels.84 
Especially with DMO’s information cost measures, one might justifiably be 
concerned that firms enjoy significant influence over their own information 
costs.  Two of their three measures – dispersion of analyst forecast errors and 
mean analyst forecast error – depend to some extent on the quality of earnings 
guidance that each firm offers to analysts.  Individual firms may choose to be 
more or less open with their earnings forecasts,85 and they may actively man-
age analyst opinions in their communications with analysts.86  So DMO’s in-
formation cost measures are not exogenously determined; firm managers may 
influence outsiders’ information costs.   
Another potential concern with DMO’s information costs measures is that 
independent directors are not outsiders to the firm in the way that analysts are.  
Independent directors have much greater access to information than analysts.  
So a firm that is not transparent to analysts may yet be transparent to indepen-
dent directors.  In essence, analysts’ difficulties predicting a firm’s earnings 
may be only a very rough proxy for information costs to directors.   
In any event, DMO offer a thought-provoking analysis and an early test of 
the theoretical literature arguing that independent directors’ efficacy depends 
on their information costs. 
CONCLUSION 
Where do we go from here?  The Hwang and Kim and DMO studies im-
prove our understanding of independent directors’ incentives and information 
constraints by suggesting a broader range of considerations for predicting and 
designing independent director efficacy.  These studies offer plausible explana-
tions, consistent with the theoretical literature, for why prior empirical work 
has been unable to discern an association between board independence and 
firm value.  The analyses offer early guidance for developing a richer frame-
work for assessing directors’ independence and refining our expectations about 
independent directors’ capacities. 
 
83 Todd A. Gormley, Bong Hwan Kim & Xiumin Martin, Can Firms Adjust Their Opa-
queness to Lenders? Evidence from Foreign Bank Entry Into India 4 (June 15, 2010) (un-
published manuscript),  available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1265109.  
84 Id. at 30-31. 
85 See generally Foley & Lardner LLP, The Art of the Analyst Conference Call and Earn-
ings Forecasts – To Guide or Not Guide, 2007 NATIONAL DIRECTORS INSTITUTE, 
http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31Publications/FileUpload137/4024/ArtAnalystConference
Call.pdf (last visited April 21, 2011) (noting that some high-profile companies have discon-
tinued the common practice of offering earnings guidance). 
86 Id. (characterizing a quarterly conference call with analysts as “a valuable opportunity 
for a company to frame itself and its results in the way it wants investors to view them”). 
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Ultimately, it may be that no affirmative policy response exists for the 
shared background factors that Hwang and Kim identify.  Similarly, assuming 
firms’ information environments affect independent directors’ efficacy, regula-
tory intervention to optimize firm information costs may be difficult, given in-
siders’ inherent ability to influence their firms’ information environments.   
We may yet hope against hope that director independence could be the mag-
ic bullet for corporate governance.  But there might be no magic. 
 
